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WISCONSIN'S UNFAIR SALES ACT
UNFAIR TO WHOM?
MICHAEL P. WAXMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act' was enacted in 1939
during the Great Depression to prevent large retailers from
selling below cost, an "act of unfair competition ' '2 which was
seen as one of the primary causes of small business failures.
Despite numerous amendments during the almost half cen-
tury since its passage, its ostensible purpose has remained
the same: to protect small retailers from predatory pricing.
Yet the Act has been rarely enforced. It has been analyzed
in only five reported judicial decisions 4 and eleven Attorney
General advisory opinions. In the most recent reported
case, State v. Eau Claire Oil Co. ,6 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, while upholding the constitutionality of the Act,7
called for legislative action to review and, possibly, repeal
the Act.8 Since then, five bills to repeal the Act have been
considered by the Wisconsin Legislature.9 None have
passed.
* B.S. Cornell University, 1969; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1972; Assistant
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Wis. STAT. § 100.30 (1979).
2. IA R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MO-
NOPOLIES § 7.02 at 9 (4th ed. 1981).
3. Note, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 425, 425-26.
4. State v. Eau Claire Oil Co., 35 Wis. 2d 724, 151 N.W.2d 634 (1967); Heiden v.
Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 150 N.W.2d 467 (1967); State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48
N.W.2d 460 (195 1); State ex rel. Heath v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N.W.2d
647 (1947); State v. Twentieth Century Mkt., 236 Wis. 215, 294 N.W. 873 (1941).
5. 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 516 (1974); 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 136 (1966); 53 Op. Att'y Gen.
1 (1964); 44 Op. Att'y Gen. 352 (1955); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 104 (1954); 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. 27 (1954); 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 172 (1949); 37 Op. Atty Gen. 420 (1948); 36 Op.
Att'y Gen. 459 (1947); 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 424 (1945); 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 700 (1939).
6. 35 Wis. 2d 724, 151 N.W.2d 634 (1967).
7. Id. at 732-33, 151 N.W.2d at 638-39, citing with approval its earlier finding of
constitutionality in State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 384-85, 48 N.W.2d 460, 463 (1951).
But see State v. Ross, 259 Wis. at 388-90, 48 N.W.2d at 465-66 (Gehl, J., dissenting).
8. State v. Eau Claire Oil Co., 35 Wis. 2d at 734-36, 151 N.W.2d at 639-40.
9. Numerous efforts have been made since 1967 to either repeal or otherwise limit
the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act. Wis. S.B. 403 (1981), Wis. A.B. 518 (1981), Wis. S.B.
599 (1977), Wis. A.B. 931 (1977), Wis. S.B. 317 (1975) (to repeal the Act); Wis. S.B.
257 (1979), Wis. A.B. 1324 (1973) (to eliminate criminal conviction); Wis. S.B. 616
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The failure of these bills raises an interesting question for
students of the legislative process. Why is an act which is
seldom enforced and substantially criticized by the highest
court in the state seemingly immune from repeal? Presuma-
bly the answer is that the Act provides a certain degree of
protection to some class of citizens which that class is unwill-
ing to relinquish regardless of how small that protection is in
reality.10
This article will review the Unfair Sales Act from the
point of view of those it is intended to protect - the small
businessmen. Specifically, it will focus on the events leading
to the enactment of the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act, the op-
eration of the Act in theory and practice, the relationship of
the Act to other Wisconsin trade regulation laws, the ineffec-
tiveness of the Act and alternative solutions.
II. THE ENACTMENT OF THE WISCONSIN UNFAIR SALES
ACT
From 1890 to World War I significant efforts were made
through federal" and state law 2 to establish statutory stan-
(1977), Wis. A.B. 930 (1977) (to lower the above cost minimum); Wis. S.B. 105 (1981),
Wis. A.B. 167 (1981) (to exempt business in "enterprise zones").
10. Legislative protection tends to be at odds with our oft stated belief in a free
enterprise system. This inconsistency can be seen in the legislative intent section of
Chapter 133 which provides that:
It is the intent of the legislature to make competition the fundamental eco-
nomic policy of this state and, to that end, state regulatory agencies shall re-
gard the public interest as requiring the preservation and promotion of the
maximum level of competition in any regulated industry consistent with the
other public interest goals established by the legislature.
Wis. STAT. § 133.01 (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, we give lip service to the goal of
unfettered competition yet regulate certain industries in order to achieve other so-
cially desirable goals. Although the value of legislatively protecting small business
has been hotly debated, this article will assume for the sake of analysis that this pro-
tection is necessary. On the issue of protecting small business, see generally Yes, Vir-
ginia, There is Still a Robinson-Patman Act (But Should There Be?), 45 ANTITRUST
L.J. 14 (1976). Compare Kintner, Henneberger & Fleischaker, Reform of the Robin-
son-PatmanAct:.A Second Look, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 203; Wolfe, Reform or Repeal
of the Robinson-Patman Act: Another View, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 237 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1982);
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 (1973 & Supp. 1982); and Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
12. See, e.g., Wisconsin "little Sherman Act," Wis. STAT. § 133.03 (1979).
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dards to regulate unfair trade practices. These laws were es-
sentially attempts to introduce rules of fair play into the free-
for-all of mercantile competition. The early trade regulation
legislation created guidelines more akin to "foul lines" in
baseball than a straight and narrow path. These guidelines
indicated the boundaries beyond which a trade practice en-
ters the realm of unfair competition, but generally did not
define gradations of "bad" acts within the trade practice
"playing field."' 13
After World War I there was a lull in trade regulation
laws until the economic woes of the Great Depression fos-
tered the passage of legislation more specific in its rules and
more extreme in its measures than the early trade regulation
laws. The state and federal legislatures found themselves
under pressure to produce legislation which would stem the
tide of small business failures. On the federal scene this
culminated in the passage of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (NRA).14 One of the primary goals of the NRA was
to prevent economic dislocation of "mom and pop" shops by
the growth of "mass-merchandisers."'' 5
Although the NRA was declared unconstitutional, 16 nu-
merous politically popular laws were enacted which estab-
lished trade regulation concepts similar to those of the NRA.
The Robinson-Patman Act amendments to Section 2 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act 7 and state versions called "little
Robinson-Patman" acts,' 8 as well as the abundance of unfair
13. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) provides:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful." Sherman Anti-
trust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
14. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as NRA].
15. The NRA Codes contained 352 provisions prohibiting sales below costs. L.
LYON, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 580-83, 585 (1935). "The stat-
utes [unfair sales acts] are lineal descendants of the code provisions, both deriving
from the depression." Note, supra note 2, at 426 n.4.
16. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Supp. 1982).
18. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17040-42 (West 1964); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 540.01-540.06 (West 1972); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 551.1-551.2, 551.4-551.11
(West 1950); 1981 KY. REv. STAT. & R. SERV. §§ 365.020,365.050-365.090 (Baldwin);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.03 (West 1981). For a complete survey of unfair sales and
price discrimination acts, see Goodrich, Minnesota Price Discrimination and Sales-Be-
19831
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sales acts, 19 resurrected many concepts embodied in the
NRA but generally withstood constitutional scrutiny.20  In
Wisconsin, a little Robinson-Patman Act2' was passed in
191322 and a general Unfair Sales Act 23 was passed in 1939.24
Although the little Robinson-Patman Act and the Unfair
Sales Act were passed at different times, they arose from the
same concern for protecting small business from mass-mer-
chandiser economic power.25 The former was intended to
protect small business from large purchasers exercising their
more powerful buying power.26 The latter was intended to
protect small businesses from being undersold by larger
businesses selling at low prices.27 The latter was reinforced
by the Wisconsin Fair Trade Act.28
low-Cost Statutes: Should They Be Repealed, Amended or Left Alone?, 5 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REv. 1, 83-107 App. (1979).
19. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17030, 17043-44 (West 1970); 1981 Ky.
REV. STAT. & R. SERV. § 365.030 (Baldwin 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211-217
(Purdon 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-150 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 69-301-306 (1976).
20. IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.09.
21. Wis. STAT. §§ 133.04-133.05 (1979).
22. Act of May 2, 1913, ch. 165, 1913 Wis. Laws 159 & Act of May 1, 1935, ch. 52,
1935 Wis. Laws 80.
23. Wis. STAT. § 100.30 (1979).
24. Act of May 2, 1939, ch. 56, 1939 Wis. Laws 72.
25. Note, Statutory Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big
Business, 25 VA. L. REV. 699 (1939).
26. Wis. Stat. § 133.04 (1979). See Gifford, PromotionalPrice-Cutting andSection
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1045-46.
27. Note, supra note 3, at 425-27.
28. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 133.25 (1974) (repealed 1977). The fair trade laws were a
state-sanctioned method of distribution which permitted a manufacturer to fix the
prices at which his goods were to be resold by wholesalers and retailers after title to
the goods had passed to them. Although the Wisconsin Fair Trade Act was upheld as
constitutional in Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426
(1937), it legalized resale price maintenance, which is illegal per se under the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
In 1937 the United States Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act, Act of Aug. 17,
1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (repealed 1975) which amended the Sherman Act. The
Miller-Tydings Act was a federal enabling statute which created an exemption from
antitrust coverage for resale price maintenance if a state chose to have a "fair trade"
act. In 1952 Congress passed the McGuire Act, Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, § 2, 66
Stat. 632 (repealed 1975), which included "nonsigner" enforcement in the federal an-
titrust exemption. In 1975 Congress enacted the Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Act of
Dec. 12, 1975, § 2, 89 Stat. 801, which repealed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
effective March 11, 1976.
Wisconsin repealed its Fair Trade Act in 1977 (Act of July 21, 1977, ch. 49, 1977
Wis. Laws 49) in response to the repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts.
[Vol. 66:293
UNFAIR SALES ACT
The Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act is very similar to most
unfair sales acts passed in the 1930's after the NRA was de-
clared unconstitutional.29 Intended to rectify the imbalance
of power that permitted mass merchandisers to sell at a
lower price than small businesses (especially below cost loss
leaders), it was primarily directed at retail sales to the ulti-
mate consumer rather than wholesale operations. As set
forth in the policy section of the Act, "the practice of selling
• ..below cost in order to attract patronage is generally a
form of deceptive advertising and an unfair method of com-
petition in commerce." 30
The policy would seem to exclude below cost sales to re-
tailers as it is assumed retailers know enough to protect
themselves from deceptive advertising. In any event the
problem of the wholesaler who discounts his price to one
retailer over another is taken care of by the little Robinson-
Patman Act which requires wholesale prices to be offered
equally to all buyers.31 Also, if a wholesaler used very low
prices to drive competitors out of business or to otherwise
inflict deadly competitive harm, it would violate the "preda-
tory pricing' 32 standards of the little Sherman Act.33
With the recent double digit inflation seen as the greatest
threat to our economy, it is hard for us to imagine what it
was like to live in a time of falling prices. But price cutting
was just as feared in the Great Depression as rising prices
are today. The Unfair Sales Act reflects a fear of a cascad-
ing chain of events culminating in depression.34 The links in
the chain are: (1) mass-merchandisers would, through vari-
ous improper acts, lure consumers away from "dealers who
29. Houston, Minimum Markup Laws: An Empirical Assessment, 57 J. RETAILING
98, 99 (1981).
30. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(1) (1979).
31. Wis. STAT. §§ 133.04-.05 (1979). See also Id. § 133.17.
32. "Predatory pricing" has been generally defined as "an antitrust violation gen-
erally manifested by selling below one's own cost for the purpose of effectuating long
term domination of the market." Outboard Motor Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384,
400 (D. Del. 1978). "[It is] motivated either by an intent to destroy competition or to
eliminate competition." IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.52. For a brief legal/
economic definition see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1981), which describes
predatory pricing as "pricing below the short-run profit maximizing price, or pricing
below variously defined costs." Id. at 190.
33. Wis. STAT. § 133.03 (1979).
34. Id. § 100.30(1).
1983]
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maintain a fair price"; (2) "fair price" dealers (generally
"mom and pop" shops) would be driven out of business,
causing commercial dislocation and bankruptcies; (3) the
failure of many small businesses would lead to an "inevita-
ble train of undesirable consequences, including depres-
sion. ' 35 Theoretically, this would also lead to price increases
once the "fair price" competition was out of business. It is
this sequence of events which the Wisconsin Unfair Sales
Act was intended to prevent.
III. How THE UNFAIR SALES ACT OPERATES IN THEORY
The Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act has three particular pur-
poses: (1) to prevent unfair discrimination by wholesalers;
(2) to prevent "predatory price-cutting" by wholesalers and
retailers; and (3) to protect small retailers by requiring that
sales prices be at least a certain percentage above cost. In
order to protect small business from the disastrous conse-
quences of price-cutting the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act es-
tablished a "fair price policy ' 36 and a method of computing
a "fair price." The fair price policy is, simply stated, that the
selling price for a retailer shall be greater than "cost" as de-
fined by the statute.37 Cost to the retailer (in the absence of
proof of a lesser cost) is the retailer's purchase cost plus over-
head plus six percent. 8 Cost to the wholesaler equals the
wholesaler's purchase cost plus overhead plus three per-
cent.39 Thus, subject to certain specific statutory defenses, 40
advertising or offering for sale or selling below cost is illegal.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 100.30(2).
38. Id. § 100.30(2)(a).
39. Id. § 100.30(2)(b).
40. Id. § 100.30(6), which provides:
(6) EXCEPTIONS. (a) The provisions of this section shall not apply to sales
at retail or sales at wholesale where:
1. Merchandise is sold in bona fide clearance sales.
2. Perishable merchandise must be sold promptly in order to forestall
loss.
3. Merchandise is imperfect or damaged or is being discontinued.
4. Merchandise is sold upon the final liquidation of any business.
5. Merchandise is sold for charitable purposes or to relief agencies.
6. Merchandise is sold on contract to departments of the government or
governmental institutions.
[Vol. 66:293
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Although the computation of cost appears fairly simple,41
it becomes more difficult when you begin to apply it to a
variety of merchandising schemes, such as the sale of an
item significantly below cost to induce other purchases
(often referred to as a "loss leader"),42 or the giving of an
item which does not require another purchase (gift), or the
tying of a gift or below-cost item to the purchase of another
item. Under the Unfair Sales Act loss leaders, whether sepa-
rate or tied, are illegal,43 while gifts that are not tied to the
sale of other items are legal.44
On the other hand, gifts that are tied to the sale of an-
other item may or may not be legal depending on whether
their overall selling price is below cost. There are two ac-
cepted ways for computing whether such sales are below
cost.45 First, when the gift has no disclosed price, the selling
price of all items could be totaled and then the cost could be
7. The price of merchandise is made in good faith to meet an existing
price of a competitor and is based upon evidence in the possession of the seller
in the form of an advertisement, proof of sale or receipted purchase.
8. Merchandise is sold by any officer acting under the order or direction
of any court.
(b) No person may claim the exemptions under par. (a) I to 4 if he limits
or otherwise restricts the quantity of such merchandise which can be
purchased by any buyer or if he fails to conspicuously disclose the reason for
such sale in all advertisements relating thereto and on a label or tag on such
merchandise or on a placard where the merchandise is displayed for sale.
41. Id. § 100.30(2).
42. Callman defines a "leader" as "[a]n article offered for sale at a greatly re-
duced price for the purpose of attracting trade. . . . If it sells at less than cost to the
seller, it is a 'loss leader."' IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 5.44. The Wisconsin
Unfair Sales Act broadly prohibits loss leaders and assumes an illegal purpose even if
an intent cannot be proven. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(3) (1979) provides:
Any sale of any item of merchandise either by a retailer or wholesaler, at less
than cost as defined in this section with the intent or effect of inducing the
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competi-
tor, impairs and prevents fair competition, injures public welfare and is unfair
competition and contrary to public policy and the policy of this section. Such
sales are prohibited.
43. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(3) (1979). This would be a violation even if the defend-
ant realized an overall profit which would otherwise comply with the Act. State v.
Eau Claire Oil Co., 35 Wis. 2d 724, 735, 151 N.W.2d 634, 640 (1967).
44. 44 Op. Att'y Gen. 352, 353 (1955). Therefore, if a bar of soap is "sold" for a
penny ($.01) the sale would be in violation of the Act if the soap cost the seller a price
approaching a penny. Yet the same bar of soap given away would constitute a gift
and be in compliance with the Act.
45. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(2)0) (1979).
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subtracted. 6 Each item "below cost" is thereby assisted by
above-cost items - this method is easiest when the items are
of the same type, hardest when they are goods of varying
nature. Second, where each item is assigned a separate
price, the Act requires that the selling price of each item
must not be below cost. A strict accounting method must be
used to protect retailers and wholesalers from suit.
Enforcement of the statute is by injunction and/or crimi-
nal prosecution. Any person damaged or threatened with
loss or injury may seek injunctive relief.47 If the private liti-
gant sues and wins, the violator must pay the plaintiff's court
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.48 Unfortunately, there is
no provision for recovery of damages. What must be shown
to prove damage or the threat of loss is unclear. What is
clear is that the standard of proof is very high.4 9
Interestingly, the standards for obtaining a criminal con-
viction appear fairly simple: evidence of any sale, advertise-
ment or offering for sale of any item of merchandise at less
than cost shall be prima facie evidence of intent to induce
the purchase of other merchandise in violation of the stat-
ute.50 The retailer or wholesaler could be fined or impris-
oned or both51 if he cannot: (1) refute the below-cost selling
charge; (2) show that he is meeting what he justifiably be-
lieves to be legal competition of a competitor; or (3) fit under
the eight particular exceptions enumerated in the statute.52
In addition, there are other special remedies available to dis-
trict attorneys and the Wisconsin Department of Agricul-
ture, Trade and Consumer Protection. 3
46. Id.; 44 Op. Att'y Gen. 352, 353 (1955). See also State ex rel. Heath v. Tankar
Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 222-23, 26 N.W.2d 647, 649 (1947).
47. WIS. STAT. § 100.30(5)(c) (1979).
48. Id.
49. Heiden v. Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 638-39, 150 N.W.2d 467, 470-71 (1967).
Surprisingly, the standard sufficient to establish a prima facie criminal case is signifi-
cantly easier to meet than the unclear civil one. Further, the retailer's theory that any
sale below cost must injure him was "based upon 'sheer speculation.'" Id. "[T]here
is no presumption of loss or threat of injury to competitors from the fact of a sale
below cost arising out of sec. 100.30(5), Stats. 1963 .... " Id. at 639, 150 N.W.2d at
470.
50. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(3) (1979).
51. Id. § 100.30(4).
52. Id. § 100.30(6)(a).
53. 1d. § 100.30(5)(a), (b).
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The prima facie test or presumption of intent to injure
was written into the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act in order to
meet a constitutional challenge. The only unfair sales acts
that have successfully withstood constitutional attack have
been those which require an intent to injure or destroy a
competitor's business by below cost selling.54 In its initial
review of section 100.30 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that the state had failed to prove an intent to injure or
destroy a competitor's business as required in the policy sec-
tion. Thus the Wisconsin Legislature faced the problem of
lessening the state's burden of proof yet maintaining the stat-
ute's constitutionality. The legislature responded to this
problem by making the advertising or offering for sale or
selling below cost prima facie proof of intent to injure. 6
This new standard was subsequently approved by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in State v. Ross. 5 7
IV. How THE UNFAIR SALES ACT OPERATES
IN PRACTICE
Given the high cost of maintaining records sufficient to
defend against suits under the Unfair Sales Act and the
seemingly limitless imagination mass merchandisers show in
devising marketing schemes, 58 violations of the statute
should be very common. 59 Yet there have been very few
cases brought under the statute. Indeed, there are no re-
corded decisions since 1967. There are several reasons for
this lack of interest in the Act.
First, there is very little incentive to bring private actions.
Because the Unfair Sales Act contains no provision for re-
54. 1A R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.08.
55. State v. Twentieth Century Mkt., 236 Wis. 215, 221-23, 294 N.W. 873, 876
(1940).
56. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(3) (1979).
57. 259 Wis. 379, 385-86, 48 N.W.2d 460, 463-64 (1951). See also 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. 27 (1954).
58. Examples of marketing schemes are vertical integration of the distribution
chain, "housebranding" and "one-cent sales," in which a consumer purchases an item
at the "regular" price and for a penny more the consumer gets an equivalent amount
of the same item. As to vertical integration and housebranding see Part III and ac-
companying notes.
59. Heiden v. Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 639-40, 150 N.W.2d 467, 471 (1967).
See also infra note 63.
1983]
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covery of damages and the standard of proof is uncertain in
private suits, only one case has been brought by a private
plaintiff.60 The most effective trade regulation laws are ones
that are privately enforced 6' because competitors have the
greatest interest, most knowledge, most to be gained and
most resources to devote to pursuing violators. If the Unfair
Sales Act had private treble damage provisions62 similar to
the antitrust laws, it would make it worthwhile for attorneys
to take on cases under contingent fee agreements. The pros-
pect of treble damages at the end of a long and tedious anti-
trust case has spurred on many private litigants' attorneys.
Without such damage provisions there will never be many
private actions under the Unfair Sales Act.
Secondly, state authorities are apparently reluctant to en-
force a criminal statute which relies on a presumption of in-
tent to act illegally.63 Selling below cost is not illegal if it is
only done to gain business.6 It becomes illegal when it is
done with the intent to injure competitors or destroy compe-
60. Heiden v. Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 150 N.W.2d 467 (1967).
61. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1982); Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Supp. 1982).
62. Proposed Bill of the Special Committee on the Unfair Sales Act to the Legis-
lative Council, Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, No. 127/2, at 5 (Jan. 20, 1981).
63. Letter from Robert H. Park, Chief, Business Practices Section, Bureau of
Trade Practices, Trade Division, Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and
Consumer Protection, Madison, Wisconsin to E. Gail Misfeldt, Assistant Professor,
Department of Habitational Resources, School of Home Economics, University of
Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, Wisconsin (Apr. 19, 1979).
The honoring of the Act appears to be more in its breach, than in compliance.
See, e.g., Heiden v. Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 640-41, 150 N.W.2d 467, 471 (1967).
Since 1970 district attorneys have brought only 16 cases out of approximately 7,000-
10,000 written complaints. These cases are all unrecorded Wisconsin Circuit Court
opinions. Interestingly, most of the defendants pled guilty or nolo contendere despite
the fact that they would be subject to possible imprisonment for this violation. Al-
though these outcomes have been the result of plea bargaining and have resulted in
only small fines, there may be increased fines and contempt citations for future viola-
tions.
Only two cases have been contested. In State v. Shopko Stores, No. 10629 (La
Crosse County Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 1978), Judge Montabon dismissed the case for denial
of equal protection through selective enforcement. The complaint was dismissed also
in the other contested case, State v. Cub Foods, No. 82-CV-851 (Brown County Cir.
Ct. July 19, 1982).
64. "Nothing prevents the seller from selling below cost, if he wishes to do so; he
is under no obligation to attempt to realize a profit .... If the law dictated other-
wise, it would necessarily mandate an invasion of private business..... 1A R.
CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.01, at 3.
[Vol. 66:293
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tition.65  The problem with prima facie proof as applied
under the Unfair Sales Act is that the Act presumes the pur-
pose of the below cost selling is to destroy competition and
thereby shifts the burden to the defendant.66 Although a
malevolent purpose may be inferred from a course of con-
duct such as the systematic and continuous undercutting of a
particular rival while having superior financial resources, en-
forcement officials are naturally reluctant to presume such
purpose without a great deal of evidence or a long history of
participation in a scheme of systematic price-cutting with no
other purpose than the destruction of a competitor.67
A third reason the Act is not enforced is the exception
created by an interpretation of the Unfair Sales Act by the
Wisconsin Attorney General which gives mass merchandis-
ers a great advantage over small retailers. The opinion per-
mits the sale of "house" or "private label" brands for less
than branded products, 68 while prohibiting retailers from re-
65. "[TIhe phrase 'to injure competition' is meaningful only with the additional
word 'illegally.'" lA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.08. "The element of illegality is
not the low price of a particular bargain nor the fact that [a seller] is willing to suffer
loss, but the fact that [the seller] has adopted a plan or scheme of aggression - sys-
tematic price-cutting - with the destruction of a competitor as his ultimate goal." Id.§ 7.01.
66. State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 385, 48 N.W.2d 461, 463-64 (1931). See also
Note, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 395, 400.
The validity of the prima facie proof standard is very questionable. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), declared mandatory presumptions unconstitutional. A
mandatory presumption is "an irrebuttable direction by the court to find the pre-
sumed fact once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption." Id. at 517.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is divided as to the proper application of Sand-
strom. The majority in Muller v. State found that as long as only "some" evidence is
required from the defendant there is no shifting of the burden of proof. 94 Wis. 2d
450, 473-78, 289 N.W.2d 570, 579-84 (1980). A vigorous dissent decried the majority's
interpretation and recommended a more literal following of Sandstrom. Id. at 478-
90, 289 N.W.2d at 584-90 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The Unfair Sales Act prima
facie proof standard appears to violate either interpretation. See Note, 1980 Wis. L.
REv. 366.
67. IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, §§ 7.01, 7.16-.17. Note the limited number of
cases brought under the Act. See also supra notes 4 & 63.
68. After the branding decision has been made, the manufacturer has three
options with respect to brand sponsorship. The product may be launched as a
manufacturer's brand (also called a national brand) where the manufacturer is
recognized as the producer of the product. Or the manufacturer may sell the
product in bulk to middlemen who put on aprivate brand (also called middle-
men brand, distributor brand, or dealer brand). Or the manufacturer may
decide to produce some output under its own name and some output that is
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ducing the price of branded products below the "fair" price
to compete with the house brands.69 Obviously, this opinion
places the small retailer at a disadvantage as he has little
access to the house brands being sold by the mass merchan-
diser yet cannot reduce the price of his branded goods to
compete with the mass merchandiser's lower priced house
brands. This has probably led to the development of group
purchasing of house brands by some smaller retailers, but
has never really put them on a competitive level with the
mass merchandiser.
In addition, a marketer who acts as his own wholesaler
may allocate his profit even on branded label products to the
wholesale or retail level depending upon which level better
suits his purpose.70 For example, if the "in house" marketer
wholesales the item to himself (as retailer) he can make a
very small profit at the wholesale level and thus give his re-
tailer self a lower cost basis for compliance with the Unfair
Sales Act. This would mean that the vertically integrated
marketer could comply with the law while having both
house brand and branded label products at prices below the
level of his small business competitors.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WISCONSIN
UNFAIR SALES ACT AND OTHER WISCONSIN
TRADE REGULATION LAWS
As described above, the primary purpose of the Unfair
Sales Act was to put a stop to the below cost pricing schemes
used by mass merchandisers to force out small businesses.
However, the Wisconsin little Sherman Act7' does a better
sold under private labels [also called house brand]. For example, Kellogg's,
International Harvester, and IBM produce virtually all of their output under
various distributors' names. Whirlpool produces output both under its own
name and under distributors' names.
P. KOTLER, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING, at 377-78 (1980).
69. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 27, 31 (1954). Although the opinion is unclear, a small
retailer may be able to overcome the exception if he can show that consumers did not
distinguish between the house brand and branded label.
70. Although the wholesaler-retailer must comply with Wis. STAT. § 100.30(2)(i)
(1979) (which requires a vertically integrated marketer to maintain both the whole-
saler and retailer minimum mark-up percentages), his allocation of profit will permit
extensive manipulation.
71. Wis. STAT. § 133.03 (1979).
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job of addressing the root problem of predatory pricing than
does the Unfair Sales Act. As noted by Callman,72 an im-
proper horizontal practice (retail or wholesale) would be the
sale of an item of merchandise at a price which is not just
below a price the competitor could not meet or beat, or even
a price which is intended to "steal" customers, but one which
is intended to drive merchant(s) out of business. This would
be "predatory pricing. 73
Because predatory pricing has been considered to be an
evil act undermining the open and free marketplace, it has
been the subject of significant legislative74 and judicial ac-
tion.75  Numerous articles have been written by renowned
authors76 analyzing the price at which the practice of below
cost selling enters the realm of predatory pricing.
The Wisconsin little Sherman Act, like its federal coun-
terpart, addresses the concern for predatory pricing.77 Sec-
72. IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 7.01. See also Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 fThe Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv.
697 (1975).
73. A firm which drives out or excludes rivals by selling at unremunerative prices
is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior that may properly be called
predatory. There is, therefore, good reason for including a "predatory pricing" anti-
trust offense within the proscription of monopolization or attempts to monopolize in
section 2 of the Sherman Act. Areeda & Turner, supra note 72, at 697.
74. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1982); Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (Supp. 1982); Robinson-Patman Act Amend-
ment § 3 to the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
§§ 133.03-.04 (1979). See also ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, PRO-
POSED PREDATORY PRACTICES ACT, APPENDIX B (ABA Antitrust Section, Mono-
graph No. 4, 1980).
In addition to the clear concern for predatory pricing under the Sherman Act,
interstate predatory pricing by wholesalers is effectively controlled by section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c) (Supp. 1982). Unlike section 2 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, price discrimination is not a necessary element.
75. See, e.g., Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior
Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
76. Concerns for predatory pricing under the Sherman Act and for primary line
injury under the Robinson-Patman Act are identical. Areeda & Turner, supra note
72, at 727. Profs. Areeda and Turner's analysis would also hold true for the Unfair
Sales Act concern for predatory "below cost" pricing. See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 72; Areeda & Turner, Scherer On Predatory Pricing: A Repo, 89 HARV. L. REv.
891 (1976); Scherer, Predatory Pricing andthe ShermanAct: A Comment, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 868 (1976); see also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 7C (1978),
which contains a slightly modified test analysis.
77. A National District Attorneys Association - United States Department of
Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration treatise on state antitrust law di-
1983]
MARQ UETTE L4W REVIEW[
tion 133.03(1) declares every contract combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade to be illegal.78 Attempts to
monopolize and successful monopoly are declared illegal
whether done individually or as a conspiracy. 79 The punish-
ment for violation of either section may be a substantial fine
and a long-term imprisonment.8 0 These penalties are more
than ten times the possible punishment under the Wisconsin
Unfair Sales Act.
Although the major thrust of the Unfair Sales Act is at
horizontal competition, the statute clearly also applies to
vertical competition. Analysis will show the Unfair Sales
Act does not remedy any significant discrimination or unrea-
sonably competitive harm in trade between wholesalers and
retailers which is not remedied by other Wisconsin statutes.
Wisconsin's little Robinson-Patman Act8 ' eliminates
most vertical effects of below cost pricing and loss leaders by
wholesalers. Like its federal counterpart, the little Robin-
son-Patman Act declares illegal discrimination in price (di-
rect or indirect) between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality.82 Therefore, sales below cost must
be priced equally to all retail purchasers of the same prod-
uct. Moreover, violations of the little Robinson-Patman Act
are punishable by fines and imprisonment greater than those
under the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act. 3
Another reason why the Act does not protect small busi-
ness is the ease with which an alleged violator can defend
himself by claiming he is just "meeting competition."8 4 The
meeting competition defense permits a party to meet what he
rectly addresses the relationship between state "sales below cost" statutes and preda-
tory pricing. It treats them identically. "Sales below cost, also known as predatory
pricing, involves pricing by the seller below his own cost in order to drive competitors
out of the market. Under federal law this practice is generally dealt with as a form of
monopolization under Sherman Act § 2. As with federal law, the practice may also
violate [state] general monopolization statutes." .4 Treatise on State Antitrust Law and
Enforcement: With Models and Forms, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 892 (Supp. 1) at 21 (Dec. 7, 1978).
78. Wis. STAT. § 133.03(l) (1979).
79. Id. § 133.03(2).
80. Id. § 133.03(l)-(3).
81. Id. §§ 133.04-.05.
82. Id. § 133.04(1).
83. Id. §§ 133.05(3), 133.05(4).
84. Meeting a legal price of a competitor is an affirmative defense which exempts
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believes is a legal price of a competitor yet lower than his
own.8 5 A legal price is the applicable mark-up under the
Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act. There are two major factors
that the meeting competitor must stand ready to prove: that
he, in good faith, 6 believed that the price was a legal one,
and that he was only meeting the price of his competitor and
not underbidding it.8 7 Since it is illegal for a competitor to
meet or beat an illegal price with further illegal prices,88 a
violating seller may gain a competitive advantage over his
competitors by selling below cost (alleging he is meeting
competition) until caught by state officials and found in vio-
lation or a competitor successfully brings an action for in-
junctive relief.
VI. WHY THE UNFAIR SALES ACT FAILS TO ACCOMPLISH
ITS GOAL OF PROTECTING SMALL BUSINESS
In sum, the Unfair Sales Act fails to address the concerns
of small business. It does not protect the vertical wholesaler-
retailer marketplace as the little Robinson-Patman Act does.
If anything, the Act shields vertically integrated mass mar-
keters. It does not protect against predatory pricing as the
little Sherman Act does. It does not even perform the func-
tion of an effective floor as a replacement for the repealed
Fair Trade Act. 89
With unfair vertical price discrimination by wholesalers
and unfair predatory pricing by retailers more effectively
controlled by other statutes, the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act
has been reduced to merely preventing the practice of pric-
sales below cost from the Unfair Sales Act. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(6)(a)(7) (1979). This
has been explained by the Wisconsin Attorney General:
Every time a dealer lowers his price to meet competition [sell at the same price
as his competitor], he has to prove that he has acted in good faith. He must
show that he in good faith believed he was meeting a legal price of his compet-
itor. If the price which the dealer sets happens to be below his competitor's
price, the dealer must also prove that he attempted in good faith only to meet
his competitor's price and did not intend to sell below his competitor.
53 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 14 (1964).
85. 53 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 10 (1964).
86. Id. at 10-14.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 28.
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ing items below the efficiency of competitors. Yet, even in
this respect the Act fails to accomplish its goal of protecting
small business. It fails because it does not provide a price
differential sufficient to save the less efficient competitor and
because effective means have been found to avoid the Act.90
The Act merely protects against advertising or offering for
sale or selling an item for less than six percent (three percent
wholesale) above a cost which is the lower of the two possi-
ble purchase costs.91 There is no research evidence that this
amount is sufficient to keep afloat less efficient businesses. 92
Further, the Act has rarely been enforced. The few state ef-
forts at enforcement have led to the imposition of minor
fines, 93 arguably a cost of doing business. Due to the uncer-
tainty of the standard of proof and the lack of incentives
only one private action has been brought.94 That action was
unsuccessful. Ultimately, the Act has not stemmed the tide
of small business bankruptcies.95
VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Despite the Unfair Sales Act's failure to achieve its goal
of protecting small business it still has many supporters. Im-
90. See Note, supra note 3, at 426 n.8. See also THE PROFIT AND PRICE PER-
FORMANCE OF LEADING FOOD CHAINS 1970-'74, STUDY PREPARED FOR THE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 12, 1977); Com-
plaint, State v. Cub Foods, No. 82-CV-851 (Brown County Cir. Ct. July 19, 1982);
Letter, supra note 63.
91. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 700, 701 (1939).
92. Two studies have been made of the effects of the Wisconsin Unfair Sales Act.
H. Cook, R. Deiter & W. Mueller, The Effects of Wisconsin's Minimum Markup
Law, No. 62, University of Wisconsin Department of Agricultural Economics (May
30, 1973); Houston, supra note 29, at 99. These studies are distinctly in conflict in
their evaluation of the Unfair Sales Act, but neither supports the concept that the
minimum statutory markup would be sufficient to support a competitive business.
93. The recent policy of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection after filing the complaint has been to plea bargain with the accused com-
pany and have it plead nolo contendere to a lesser number of counts. The court then
finds the company guilty and fines it $250 per count violated. See, e.g., State v.
K-Mart Corp., No. 80-CR-1607 (Fond du Lac County Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 1981) (2 counts
- $500); State v. Treasury Div. of J.C. Penney Co., (Dane County Cir. Ct. Feb. 27,
1981) (4 counts - $1000); State v. Kohl Corp., No. 80-CR-1210 (Fond du Lac County
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1980) (1 count- $250). The Treasury Div. of J.C Penney Co. case
has been the largest fine issued under the law.
94. Heiden v. Ray's, Inc., 34 Wis. 2d 632, 150 N.W.2d 467 (1967).
95. Houston, supra note 29, at 110.
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portant trade associations, 96 the office of the Attorney Gen-
eral,97 and the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade
and Consumer Protection98 all speak in favor of the Act's
goals. Yet it would be foolhardy to predict that the Act will
be any more vigorously enforced in the future than it has
been in the past. Indeed, the Department of Agriculture,
Trade and Consumer Protection, which has received (in con-
junction with the district attorneys) primary responsibility
for state enforcement of the Unfair Sales Act,99 readily ad-
mits that there should be either a massive enforcement cam-
paign or repeal of the Act.' °
Although the Act has engendered much controversy,
both its proponents and opponents agree it has failed to
serve the purpose for which it was originally intended and
needs to be radically altered. 10' The following alternative
remedies in combination or alone should be considered as a
96. Wis. S.B. 257 (1979) was submitted at the request of numerous retail trade
associations. Although the bill would have decriminalized the Unfair Sales Act, it
also would have greatly increased its penalties. See also, Testimony of Tom Dohm,
Wisconsin Independent Businessmen, Inc., Summary of Hearings of the Special
Comm on the Unfair Sales Act to the W~is. Legis. Council (Dec. 15, 1980).
97. Letter from Alan Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of
Justice, to Sumner P. Slichter, Esq. (Sept. 2, 1981).
98. See Testimony of Donald Soberg, Administrator, Trade Division, Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, Summary of Hearings of the
Special Comm. on the Unfair Sales Act to the Wis. Legis. Council (Dec. 15, 1980).
99. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(5)(a), (b) (1979).
100. See Departmental Correspondence of the Department of Agriculture, Trade
and Consumer Protection from C.L. Jackson [former administrator] to Gary Rohde
(Jan. 13, 1978). See also Letter, supra note 63.
Those advocating repeal of the Unfair Sales Act have concentrated on the Act's
negative impact on Wisconsin consumers. See Wis. S.B. 403 (1981); Wis. A.B. 518
(1981). Both bills were submitted at the request of the Wisconsin Consumers League.
See also Testimony of Paul Hausman, Representative of the Wisconsin Consumers
League, Summary of Hearings of the Special Comm. on the Unfair Sales Act to the Wis.
Legis. Council (Dec. 15, 1980).
101. The preceding materials have revealed a pervasive dissatisfaction with the
Act by its supporters and detractors. A 1973 bill, A. Res. 34, A.J. 1853 June 20,
(1973), even called for the establishment of a Special Committee to the Legislative
Council to study antitrust laws, predatory pricing and monopolistic business practices
in Wisconsin and to develop legislation to protect small business. Although the bill
was defeated, A Res. 13, A.J. 209 Jan. 13, (1973), its call for such a committee while
the Unfair Sales Act, little Sherman Act and little Robinson-Patman Act were in ef-
fect, indicates the ineffectiveness of the existing legislation to protect small business
from the competitive methods of big business. Contra H. Cook, R. Deiter & W.
Mueller, supra note 92. But see Houston, supra note 29.
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way of achieving the goal of protecting small business from
predatory pricing while avoiding the problems caused by the
existing legislation.
A. First - Repeal of the Unfair Sales Act
A complete repeal of the Act followed by a strengthening
of the little Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts, including
a legislative command and increased budgetary allocation to
enforce those Acts with vigor, would not only eliminate the
negative .aspects of the Act cited by the state enforcing agen-
cies but also provide them with the opportunity to demon-
strate their concern for protecting small business against
predatory conduct.
B. Second- Retention of the Unfair Sales Act as a
Private Civil Remedy
A second alternative would be to turn the Unfair Sales
Act into primarily a civil penalty statute by providing an op-
portunity for double or treble damages. This would dimin-
ish the problems of criminal penalties, selective enforcement
and the reliance on public resources to enforce the Act. In-
stead private parties, 10 2 whose self-interest has proved to be
the best enforcer of many regulatory schemes (for example,
the Robinson-Patman Act), would take over the burden of
enforcement.
C Third- Use of the Statutory Deceptive Practices
Powers
Finally, the Unfair Sales Act declares as its "policy" that
"[t]he practice of selling below cost. . . is generally a form
of deceptive advertising and an unfair method of competi-
102. Although private parties could sometimes sue as more than one plaintiff,
concerted efforts at enforcement of state sales below cost laws by a group of competi-
tors, either by agreeing to a minimum price among the competitors or by threatening
litigation has been held violative of the Sherman Act. 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T
6805 (1971). See also United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 70,432 (D. Cal. 1962); United States v. Connecticut Food Council, 1940-43
Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,167 (D. Conn. 1941); United States v. Maine Food Council,
1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,180 (D. Me. 1941); United States v. Massachusetts
Food Council, 1940-43 (CCH) 56,165 (D. Mass. 1941); United States v. Rhode Is-
land Food Council, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,175 (D. R.I. 1941).
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tion.' 10 3 Since sections 100.18 and 100.20 of the Wisconsin
Statutes prohibit respectively "deceptive advertising"'1 and
"unfair methods of competition in business and unfair trade
practices in business. ,"15 the deceptive and unfair prac-
tices proscribed by the Unfair Sales Act can be addressed by
expanding section 100.20 and attendant Department regula-
tions while correcting the inadequacies of the current law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Unfair Sales Act is an unwieldy piece of ineffective
legislation. Despite numerous complaints it rarely has been
judicially enforced. Because it provides no compensation
for injured parties it relies on society as a whole to pay the
cost of enforcement. The few actions brought by the state
are subject to charges of selective enforcement in light of the
widespread abuses in the marketplace and the ease with
which a prima facie case can be established. Unfortunately,
it helps neither the small merchant nor the consumer. A
reappraisal of the goals and accomplishments of the Unfair
Sales Act and alternative means to accomplish its worth-
while objectives is in order.
103. Wis. STAT. § 100.30(1) (1979).
104. Id. § 100.18.
105. Id. § 100.20(1).
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